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THE PRAETORIAN STATE IN THE ARAB SPRING†
KHALED ABOU EL FADL*
First, I have to say that it is always emotional to come back to
the place where you studied. I graduated from Penn Law School,
and although a lot has changed in the school since then, my years
at Penn were amazing. I actually joined UCLA when the Dean of
UCLA Law School was from Penn as well. So Penn graduates, law
school graduates, perhaps there is a future career for you in
teaching law. But, moving along from the sentimentalities of law
school and legal education to a different type of sentimentality, I
think.
The bulk of my comments today will be on the Egyptian
revolution as a case study, while making a variety of notes on the
other revolutions taking place in the region. There is a rich body of
literature for those who read in this field on the sociology and the
political theories of revolution: When do revolutions occur? What
revolutions tend to succeed? What revolutions tend to not
succeed? And especially in this literature, there are attempts to
theorize what types of revolutions under what conditions produce
successful and stable democracies. Theda Skocpol and Barrington
Moore for example, and many others, wrote quite influential works
in this field.1
† This essay is based on the transcription of the keynote lecture of Dr. Khaled
Abou El Fadl at the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law
Symposium entitled “Democracy in the Middle East,” delivered on November 11,
2011.
* Omar and Azmeralda Alfi Distinguished Professor in Islamic Law at the
UCLA School of Law. Dr. Abou El Fadl also holds the Chair in Islam and
Citizenship at the University of Tilburg, The Netherlands.
1 See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, STATES & SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF FRANCE, RUSSIA, & CHINA (1979) (examining the causes and outcomes
of the 1789 French Revolution, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Chinese
Revolution of 1911 ); THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD
(1994) (a collection of essays updating Skocpol’s earlier work by examining
dozens of armed insurrections occurring since 1956, and identifying the
ingredients that make regimes more or less susceptible to revolution);
BARRINGTON MOORE, SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND
PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (1st Edition ed. 1993) (1966)
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However, the literature on what one might call subaltern, postcolonial societies, and revolutions occurring in these types of
societies, is not nearly as rich—in fact, it is quite impoverished. As
a result, quite a bit of what we do is in the category of commentary,
rather than engaging systematic analytical paradigms through
which we try to draw some principles to understand which
revolutions produce what and why.
One of the significant factors in the revolutions that have taken
place in the Middle East is what a political scientist Amos
Perlmutter once called the “Praetorian State,” which means
basically militarized societies, or states where there is a large
military, and the military is not, so-to-speak, in the barracks.2
Rather, the military has become part of the bureaucratic state and a
substantial force in creating the middle class. It also signifies the
rootedness of the military in the administrative structure as well as
the oppressive powers of the state. Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen,
and other countries, including those that some have termed
subaltern nation states, fit within exactly that description—where
the military is like an octopus that has its tentacles in various
aspects.
In the Egyptian context, for instance, it is well known that most
governors are ex-military, and most mayors are ex-military. In
fact, part of the infrastructure of the country is the expectation that
after spending twenty or so years in the military, upon retirement
the government will appoint you, not just as a governor or a mayor
(which after all constitute a limited numbers of posts) but even
appoint you on the boards of private companies. I could give you a
million examples, but just one example, I think, will make the
point.
There is a very successful company in Egypt called Oriental
Weavers that makes rugs, and it is one of the few companies in
Egypt that actually exports a good part of its products, including to
the United States. And quite typical of numerous businesses in
countries such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and so on, is that retired
army officers are on the board of directors, and in fact, are even
(arguing that a political order becomes democratic vis-à-vis fascist and communist
dictatorships depending on whether the revolution, which all societies undergo,
originates in the landed aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, or the peasantry).
2 See AMOS PERLMUTTER, EGYPT: THE PRAETORIAN STATE (1974) (depicting
Nasser’s regime, where the political leadership of the ruling class emerges from
the ranks of the army, against the backdrop of praetorian political systems
generally).
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managers at various levels. When you talk to the people who run
these businesses, it is quite clear why they hire or accept “the
recommendation” to appoint retired army officers—because they
do not want to clash with the state. It is a part of the cost of
business. If you receive a friendly suggestion that you should
appoint General such and such to your board of directors, or give
them some managerial position, it takes a suicidal soul to say no.
This is part of the reality that the revolutions—whether in Tunisia,
Egypt, Syria, Yemen—have to confront and deal with.
As I will elaborate later, this Praetorian State structure turns
out to be significant in a variety of ways, but one of the most
important aspects is the culture of these militarized
bureaucracies—or bureaucratic military—that becomes a part of
the very mechanics of the state itself. The military is a frequent
topic of discussion after the Egyptian revolution. Its primary role
is not to fight wars, and not even to expect to fight wars, but to run
the country. And part of the military creed (al-’aqīda al-’askariyya)
that is explicitly and openly taught in military schools—whether in
Egypt, Syria, or Tunisia—is that it is only the military mind that is
incorruptible and that can achieve concrete results. Therefore, part
of the military’s ideological makeup is the expectation that it is
essential, not to defending the country, but to running the country.
And here the expression that one often hears repeated after
revolutions—“when is the military going to return to the
barracks,” or “when is the military going to be limited to the
barracks”—becomes rather complicated because the military has
never really been limited to the barracks in the first place.
Importantly, the military is ideologically rooted, in a
complicated way, in two distinct cultures. Perhaps, of course, real
specialists will tell you that the military is rooted in multiple
cultures, but two main cultures concern me and are important for
this discussion. First, the military is rooted in the general
cumulative, inherited Islamic culture that the rest of society
shares—but not fully. Second, as the expression goes, “one foot is
rooted in that shared culture with the rest of society, while another
foot is rooted in a unique subculture of the military creed,” or what
they call al-’aqīda al-’askariyya. Al-’aqīda literally means “belief,” or
a system of belief; so the second culture is that unique subculture,
or the system of belief that the military teaches.
I will recount my personal experience with the Egyptian
revolution and tie it into my broader comments about the military
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and the complexity of its role and potential effect on the so called
Arab Spring.
Of course, like most people who are Egyptian, my reaction
after the Egyptian revolution was sheer jubilation. I do not get
very excited too often in life, but the day Mubarak stepped down, I
was excited. I cracked a smile. Now, of course, if you observe the
Tunisian revolution and then the Egyptian revolution, you are
struck by several things. You are struck by the reluctance (and the
initial reluctance even in the Libyan revolution) of the populace to
resort to violence. In the case of Egypt and Tunisia, there is even a
commitment and dedication not to respond with violence. There is
an attempt to hold on to what one can call a myth that the
populace and the military are united. In the Egyptian expression,
as the demonstrators would often yell out, “Al-sha’b wa gaysh īd
wahda,”—that the people and the army are one hand. And, of
course, people use this rallying cry to appeal to the army not to use
violence against the demonstrators. It did not go very far in Libya,
it did not go anywhere in Yemen, and it did not go anywhere in
Bahrain, although in all of these revolutions, that slogan was
attempted. It was successful to an extent in Tunisia and Egypt.
But at the same time, there is this rallying cry; it is mixed with
expressions that would appear remarkably radical to those who
thought Islamic societies are static and despotic. Many of the
campaigns and slogans spoke clearly of liberty and dignity, and
spoke of them as God-given rights. And as some of you might
remember, many of the rallying cries during these revolutions
used expressions like, “Allāhu Akbar,” God is great. There is a
whole fascinating discourse about martyrdom that deserves its
own study—wherein referring to the many of those who joined the
revolution and were killed, the discourse was steeped in
theological paradigms of martyrdom. For example, a friend of
mine woke up and told his mother, “I’m going to become a
martyr,” and kissed everyone in his family goodbye, saying,
“Don’t be sad for me, I’m going to be martyred.” Of course it is
fascinating that martyrdom means being killed while engaging in
peaceful demonstrations and peaceful resistance, and not while
engaging in any violent activity. Furthermore, whether in the
Egyptian or Tunisian or Libyan context, the theology of jihad was
used quite heavily. Here, jihad is the idea that one is engaged in a
struggle that is ultimately favorable in God’s eye, and that if one is
killed during the struggle, he or she dies a martyr.
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In the midst of all of this, one might notice a worrisome factor.
One of the images of the Egyptian revolution was that of
multitudes of people on a bridge, attempting to pray while being
sprayed with water. Or, take for example, the various images of
people attempting to perform their prayers while being attacked
by security forces, or run over by cars. In the case of Libya and
Yemen, there was the bombardment of mosques. These images
underscored—and this again reflects many of the discourses that I
have heard and engaged in after the revolution in Egypt—the
extent to which the military and security forces are steeped in the
same notion of religious sanctities (ḥurumāt). It is a critical
sociological concept that the military and the security forces have a
different notion of ḥurumāt or religious sanctities than the
populace. The fact that the military would attack people in prayer,
or would attack a mosque, or kill some of the prominent, wellrespected religious leaders in demonstrations, was a reminder that
the military, very much like the military during the colonial age
and shortly after the post-colonial age, is of a different cultural
orientation than the populace which it rules. There is a substantial
body of literature on this point, but the revolutions served as a
very stark reminder.
Now, at some point after the initial euphoria, which I felt in the
United States, my jubilation put me on a plane to Egypt. I reached
Egypt after Mubārak had stepped down, but when there were still
various demonstrations in Tahrir Square taking place. At that
time, there were regular demonstrations to affirm and consolidate
the revolution, and to make sure that the revolution was not
usurped.
One of the most notable things about not just the Egyptian
revolution, but also the Tunisian, the Yemeni, and the Syrian
revolutions, was the critical role of Friday congregational prayers.
Nearly every major demonstration was organized around Friday
prayer, and usually the Imam would give a fiery sermon about
liberty and freedom and the centrality of liberty and freedom to
God’s law. After the Friday sermons, the demonstrations would
take place.
In that context, while I was in Egypt, I had the opportunity to
observe firsthand another critical development. Initially in Egypt,
there was great disappointment with the position of al-Azhar (the
major religious institution in Egypt) vis-à-vis the revolution—
basically, its silence. Sometime in June 2011, the Shaykh of al-
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Azhar3 announced an initiative to meet with intellectuals of all
orientations—leftists, right-wing groups, Marxists, and Islamists—
to produce what would later on become known as wathīqat alAzhar, or the “Azhar Declaration.”4 This was a very important
document in the history of Islamic theology and Islamic law, and it
produced a variety of reactions. After meeting for about two
months, everyone present signed on to the Azhar Declaration. I
will only highlight some of the most important points here.
First, the Azhar Declaration underscored a particular line of
reformers in Islām. It named people like Ḥasan al-Aṭṭār, Rifā’a alṬahṭāwī, Muḥammad ‘Abduh, Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī, ‘Abdullah
Darrāz, and Maḥmūd Shaltūt. It emphasized that there are shared
principles between those who work with Islamic commitments and
those who work with secular principles, or even atheistic
principles, and called them “common goals.” It stated that these
common goals are so anchored in Islamic theology that it is the
obligation of a Muslim to work towards these common goals and
ignore the differences. What were these common goals?
The document included about eleven principles; this is not an
exhaustive list but among the most important were:
1) that Islām does not know theocracy;
2) that Islām rejects a theocratic state;
3) that Islām mandates a national constitutional democratic
state;
4) that the constitution must be drawn by the people and
represent the will of the people;
5) that Islām affirms rights and obligations, and importantly,
refers to international human rights treaties as unequivocally
affirmed by Islām and quintessential to Islamic theology;
6) that people have an absolute right to run and administer
their countries, and have an absolute right to free elections,
freedom of speech, and freedom of belief; and
7) that it is a sin to call someone a traitor or kāfir (infidel) in
Islam.

3 The Shaykh of al-Azhar is a very influential religious position, akin to the
grand Imam, or the equivalent of the Pope in a Muslim context.

See al-Azhar Declaration on the Future of Egypt, OFFICE OF THE GRAND
IMAM,
AL-AZHAR
AL
SHARIF
(June
2011),
available
at
http://www.bibalex.org/Attachments/english/elazhar.pdf.
4
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This declaration was signed in June 2011, and seemed like
nothing short of an historic event. Its signing was covered by
numerous newspapers and magazines. Of course, the Western
media largely ignored it, but its impact within the politics of the
region was significant, often in rather surprising ways.
At that time, there seemed to be two parties that were distinctly
unhappy with the Declaration of Azhar (wathīqat al-Azhar). The
first perhaps is not surprising: the party of Wahhābī Islām, or
Saudi-backed Islām, whom I refer to as the puritans in my
writings.5 On one Friday, they held a two-million-man march to
demonstrate their power and to denounce the Declaration of Azhar
as a corruption and heretical document. They called for the
expulsion of the Shaykh of al-Azhar, Aḥmad al-Ṭayyib. This
display, in turn, resulted in a counter-two-million-man march to
demonstrate the power of the counterforce to the puritans.
The second group that became quite unhappy with the
Declaration of Azhar was the military. What I witnessed from that
point on was a fascinating process, by which, to put it bluntly,
Saudi Arabia came out quite in the open about its support of
puritanical groups and what it considers to be its stand or defense
against the corruptions of liberal Azharī Islām. At the popular
level, mainstream Egyptians did not consider the Declaration of
Azhar to be at all novel. Especially in August 2011 and into
September, the military, in confronting the appearance of the
puritanical groups, seemed to become more and more stubborn in
granting concessions to the revolutionary forces in Egypt.
Just to provide some broad outlines, initially in June, the
military announced that it was willing to meet with all Egyptian
intellectuals for discussions about the future of Egypt. In the first
meetings we attended, certain generals would basically lecture us
about democracy and government, to which we objected. We then
had a few sessions where there actually was some give and take.
After the Declaration of Azhar, what increasingly became the party
line represented by the military was: you people—meaning the
intellectuals and the people who support the Egyptian
revolution—do not know how dangerous our region is. You do
not understand the dangers posed by the puritanical Islamic
groups. You do not understand the dangers posed by an
independent Azhar (greater independence for al-Azhar was one of
See KHALED ABOU EL FADL, THE GREAT THEFT: WRESTLING ISLAM
EXTREMISTS (2005) for a detailed discussion on Wahhābī Islām.
5
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the principles that the Declaration demanded). You do not
understand the dangers of being drawn into a war with Israel.
One of the issues at the time was the so-called “oil deal,” under
which Egypt would export oil to Israel at prices far below the
market, and one of the revolutionary demands was the
renegotiation of that contract.
There are many stories of
corruptions and payoffs in conjunction with this oil deal, in which I
suspect some of the military to be involved. But, while in June we
were told that we could discuss the oil deal and that an elected
government could renegotiate the terms, in August we were
solemnly informed that any attempt to renegotiate the terms
would lead to Israel waging war on Egypt, and therefore it must
remain untouchable.
The list of untouchables seemed to increase, until we reached a
point where the military said, “Yes, we are willing to transition to
democracy; however, there are high state interests (maṣāliḥ ‘ulyā)—
such as the army, Camp David, many business issues, the position
of America, and the relationship with Saudi Arabia—that cannot
be left to the vagaries of the democratic process.”6 Here we are left
with a basic fundamental question, which I actually posed to one
of the generals: if these are high state interests that cannot be left to
an autonomous democratic process, and must be guaranteed by
the military, how much space is left for a democracy?
In fact, one of the things that has developed—and this reflects
the current reality in Egypt—is that you can write articles and you
can criticize God. You can speak profanely about Islām and
Sharī’a. But you cannot criticize the military. There are currently
about 6,000 people who are undergoing military trials in Egypt
because they have written things that are perceived to be critical of
the military or that question the position or the privileges of the
military. So how much space is left for a democracy to work in?
What does it mean to speak of a democratic revolution in a
praetorian state; in a state in which the military has become its own
monstrous interest?
The military is a possessor of sacred knowledge. It is a
possessor of that knowledge which it calls high national interests—
knowledge as to a special relationship with Israel, with the United
6 The military informed us that this is the position of the United States, and
that the United States informed the military that the military must guarantee
certain non-negotiable interests such as certain privileges for the American
military in Egypt and Camp David, as well as some other interests that I am
restricted from mentioning.
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States, with China, or with Saudi Arabia—and it becomes a form of
sacrilege to attempt to open up these issues for discussion or for
renegotiation. Of course, this situation is not entirely new or novel.
We all too often forget that there was a similar revolutionary
constitutional movement at the beginning of the twentieth century
in Iran. There was another constitutional revolution at the
beginning of the twentieth century in Egypt. And ultimately, these
revolutions were aborted by the military, whether the national
military on its own, or the national military with foreign aid.
In raising these issues, I am not trying to end on a pessimistic
note. What I am saying is that understanding revolutionary
movements and democracy is not as simple as studying whether
there is a merchant class or a strong middle class, or whether the
religious institution is cooperating or not cooperating. One of the
things that you quickly confront in the Middle East is the extent to
which the region itself is permeated with claims of various
interests of various powers, and this has become a true
mythology—a mythology that you cannot unpack. For example,
there were so many times in meetings with the military when we
were told, “if you are not careful, Saudi Arabia is ready to
bankrupt us. If you do not modify the Azharī language about
liberal Islām, Saudi Arabia will withdraw X amount of money from
Egypt and the Egyptian economy will collapse.” That is a
mythology that people on the ground have to negotiate, often
under horrendous conditions.
When I left Egypt, at least four or five of those who used to
attend those meetings with me ended up in prison, subject to
military trials (one has since been released). The expected sentence
is a three- to six-year prison term for each of them. Why? I do not
know; no one knows. But my sincere hope is that there will be
more honesty in our discourse about the real problems that
confront us on the ground when we talk about the establishment of
a democratic order.
My expectation, especially as to Egypt, is that there will be a reexplosion, meaning that matters will not be left with the military
citing what I call its sacred texts of national interests. The streets
will explode again. And they will explode again, but yet we will
be confronted with the same negotiated issues. If you have any
brilliant solutions for these issues, please let me know so that I can
use them on my next trip to Egypt, and hope that I emerge alive, or
at least emerge, unlike my friends.
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In conclusion, and on a more optimistic note, it is remarkable
that, in the midst of such a huge military bureaucracy and in the
presence of all this mythology and the obscurities and ambiguities
about who holds what power, people continue to go to the streets
and sacrifice their lives week after week after week. That to me is
sheer resolve, and in my view, if anyone has earned the right to
live in dignity, and with the right to self-determination and liberty,
it seems like the people of that region have. They have proven it in
paying the highest price. We can no longer speak about “if
democracy.” The will for democracy has been demonstrated time
and time and time again.
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